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LAWYERING, POWER, AND REFORM: THE LEGAL
CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE BROAD FORM
MINERAL DEED
DEAN HILL RIVKIN °

I. PROLOGUE

I frst drafted this essay in 1984. My long-time friend and colleague,
John Gaventa, the author of Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and
Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley,' gave my name to Professor Dennis
Brion of Washington & Lee University Law School, who was searching for
participants for a Francis Lewis Center Colloquium. John told Dennis that,
as a law professor and lawyer with experience in Appalachia, I was likely
to have ideas on translating the framework in Gaventa's book into a legal
setting. When Dennis and I spoke, I immediately thought of the legal
campaign to abrogate the broad form mineral deed in Kentucky. This was
a project that had occupied me since 1970, when, as a law student, I first
did legal work in Appalachia under the auspices of the Vanderbilt University
Student Health Coalition, then a coalition of health and legal workers who
devoted summers responding to the needs of selected communities in remote
corners of Tennessee and Kentucky.
When I joined Appalachian Research and Defense Fund (APPALRED)
in 1972 as a Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellow, the issue
of the broad form mineral deed, and its role in authorizing the widespread
damage caused by strip-mining throughout eastern Kentucky, was prominent
among residents of the coal fields. Working with individual and organizational clients, APPALRED carried on the legal campaign that had first been
seriously mounted in the late 1960s.
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Many people have
contributed to the evolution of my thinking about the role of lawyers in social reform
litigation. John Rosenberg, Director of Appalachian Research and Defense Fund of
Kentucky, Inc., and Brenda McGee deserve special recognition for assisting me throughout
this piece. Neither agrees with all I say here, but their inspiration infuses this work. I served
as counsel or advisor in many of the cases discussed, in this piece. It is intended as a
personal account, nothing more.
I. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN
AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980). Since the publication of Gaventa's book, a healthy
literature on the nature and meaning of power and resistance has emerged, some of it critical
of Gaventa's framework. See, e.g., TORBEN BECH DYRBERG, THE CIRCULAR STRUCTURE
OF POWER: POLmCS, IDENTITY, COMMUNITY 63-70 (1997); JAMES C. ScoTr, DOMINATION
AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 70-107 (1990).
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When I joined the faculty at the University of Tennessee College of
Law, I continued work on broad form deed issues. I primarily consulted
with John Rosenberg, the director of the Appalachian Research and Defense
Fund of Kentucky, and other Kentucky-based lawyers. In addition, I
represented Save Our Cumberland Mountains (SOCM), a Tennessee citizens'
organization, and its members, first in its successful legislative effort to
nullify the broad form deed in Tennessee and then to defend the legislation
in the courts.2
I was working as a clinical teacher in 1984 when I agreed to prepare
this paper for the colloquium at Washington & Lee University School of
Law. I had only intimations of the embryonic movement to reappraise
lawyering from a present standpoint, best known today by the works of
Professor Gerry L6pez,3 Professor Lucie White,4 Professor Louise Trubek,5

2.

See Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1981); see also infra notes 122-

3.

See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION

29.
OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Gerald P. L6pez, An A version To Clients:-Loving
Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 315 (1996); Gerald P.
L6pez, Economic Development in the 'Murder Capitalof the Nation, "60 TENN. L. REV. 685
(1993); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984); Gerald P. L6pez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,
77 GEo. L.J. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little A bout, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the
Pathsfrom Rhetoric to Practice, I CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) (drawing on the model of
power first elaborated by Steven Lukes in POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974)); Lucie E.
White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
861, 861-62 (1990); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987-88); Lucie E.
White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency "from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J.
1961 (1993); Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus"to End Welfare: Where Are the Women 's
Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843 (1994); Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992); Lucie White, Representing 'The Real Deal,"45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 271 (1990-1991); Lucie White, Searchingfor the Logic Behind Welfare Reform, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 427 (1996); Lucie E. White, Seeking "..
The Faces of
Otherness. . . ":A Response to ProfessorsSarat, Felstiner,and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499 (1992); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering
and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699 [hereinafter To Learn and Teach]; Lucie White, "Why
Do You Treat Us So Badly?" On Loss, Remembrance, and Responsibility, 26 CuMB. L.
REV. 809 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, CriticalLawyering: Toward a New Public Interest
Practice, I B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices:Lawyers,
Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415 (1996); Louise G. Trubek,
Introduction to the Symposium on New Approaches to Povetly Law, Teaching, and Practice,
4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 235 (1995); Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social
A rena: Strategiesfor Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (1994).
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Professor Tony Alfieri,6 and a growing number of clinicians and practitioners.7 I presented the paper at the Washington & Lee colloquium and
benefited from the exchanges of the invited respondents, including members
of the Washington & Lee law faculty and Professor Mark Tushnet. I later
presented a revised version of the paper in 1986 at a clinical legal theory
workshop at Columbia University School of Law, organized by Professor
Steve Ellmann. After the Columbia presentation, the paper hibernated for
years as I continued my consulting role with APPALRED in its representation of the Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, now known as Kentuckians for the
In the 1980s,
Commonwealth, an emergent citizens' organization.
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth organized a broad-based political
campaign against the broad form deed and, as my epilogue explains,

succeeded in gaining the passage of an amendment to the Kentucky

6. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The A ntinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri,
impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics:
Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Mitigation,Mercy, and Delay. The Moral Politics of Death Penalty A bolitionists, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1747 (1994) (book review); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 800 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination
of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992) (providing an
account of cases heard in Baltimore's rent court and focusing on the injustices suffered by
the tenants, comprised mainly of poor black women); Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, A
Battered Women's Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a
Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering That Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207 (1992) (providing a case study of how the curriculum at the
City University of New York's Law School at Queens College succeeds in teaching students
to represent battered women); Naomi R. Cahn, InconsistentStories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993)
(discussing the reasons for and the dilemmas presented by conflicting stories told by litigants
within the legal system); Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City: Lessons for the
Movement, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 67 (1993-1994) (providing an account of
community efforts which prevented a toxic waste incinerator from being built in Kettleman
City, a tiny community comprised mainly of Latino farm workers); Peter Margulies, Political
Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challengeof Legal Work Against Domestic Violence
for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493 (1996)
(discussing political lawyering and advocating a more engaged, less bureaucratic, public
interest law); Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, I D.C. L. REV. 123
(1992) (suggesting that poverty lawyers may allow their clients to choose between short-term
gain and long-term strategy, thereby empowering their clients without compromising the
interests of the poor as a class).
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Constitution abrogating the deed.8 Predictably, this provision was challenged by the coal industry on federal constitutional grounds, and the case
did not conclude until 1994. 9 APPALRED represented the landowner in the
targeted case, and John Rosenberg, along with the Attorney General of
Kentucky, argued the high-profile case for the Tennessee surface owners
before the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Over the years, many people encouraged me to publish my account.
Wary of providing any shred of impetus to the opposing side, I felt
uncomfortable revisiting the paper for publication while the legal struggle
still persisted. I also felt pre-empted by Lucie White's moving article, To
Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, °
which employed the framework of Gaventa's Powerand Powerlessness" in
the setting of South Africa, where political, economic, and social oppression
stood in the sharpest relief. 2
It has also taken me quite some time to consume the new critical
literature on lawyering in settings of stark differential power. 3 I have called
this practice "lawyering from below." Although I have been convinced
since at least the 1980s that the conceptual underpinning of public interest
and poverty law needed fundamental retuning-in academic parlance, a shift
in the paradigm-for a long time I had difficulty discerning the broader
outlines of this transformation. 4 In my lawyering during these years, I
struggled to effectuate a different vision of lawyering, but I confess that
much of my legal work even now is permeated by the rights-oriented and
structural strategies of the past. The work that is necessary to be a critical

8. Ky. CONST. § 19(2).
9. Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
10. To Learn and Teach, supra note 4.
II. GAVENTA, supra note i.
12. Others have alluded to Gaventa's concepts in analyzing critical lawyering. See,
e.g., Richard F. Klawiter, iLa Tierraes Nuestra! The Campesino Struggle in El Salvadorand
a Vision of Community-Based Lawyering, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1625 (1990) (providing an
account of land disputes between rural peasants and wealthy landowners in El Salvador and
presenting the peasants' movement as an example for U.S. reform advocates to follow).
13. See supra notes 1-7.
14. The search for a more contemporary model of public interest law advocacy has
been guided by thoughtful scholars. See JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
COMMUNITY (1990); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charne, PathsNot Yet Taken: Some Comments
on Feldman's Citique of Legal Services Practice,83 GEO. L.J. 1633 (1995); Ruth Margaret
Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty Law Scholarship,48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 999 (1994); Lois H. Johnson, The New Public Interest Law: From Old Theories to a
New Agenda, I B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (1991); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of
ProgressiveLawyezng: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modem, PostReagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994). See generally CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart

Scheingold eds., 1998).
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or collaborative lawyer does not come easily, nor does shining the beam of
penetrating self-criticism. Often feeling suspended in this shifting paradigm-between new theory and old practice-I hesitated to complete this
piece.
But I persisted when, even after these many years, I did not register
much dissonance upon re-reading this essay. Some of the functional ideas
seem terribly thin, but I wanted this piece to be included as an early
specimen of a growing genre of lawyering theory. If nowhere else, perhaps
property teachers can use this account (with some industrial-strength
doctrinal embellishment) to show property law at its most repressive." I
trust that the brief intellectual history of this article helps to place it in its
rightful perspective. There is a much larger work embodied in this story,
and I am committed to telling it in fuller fashion in the future.
II.

INTRODUCTION

In recent debates about legal theory and its relationship to social reform,
scholars have propounded different conceptions of the role of power in
shaping legal doctrine and relationships. At the risk of oversimplification,
the debate has pitted commentators who view law as a mask for the exercise
of raw class, economic, or political power 6 against those who seek to justify
the neutral legitimacy of legal institutions and rules in a complex society."
Consistently interwoven in these often acrimonious interchanges are theories
about the nature, function, and purpose of the encompassing dynamic of
power.
The abstract dialogue among academic theoreticians has all too
frequently neglected the "view from below" in formulating theories of power
and change.'" Such neglect is understandable. It is conceptually and
epistemologically difficult to uncover the often subjective nature of
professional experience in other than highly personalized accounts. While
I am wary of this methodological dilemma, in this article I nevertheless join

15. In his property casebook, Richard Chused devotes a portion of a chapter, State
and FederalConstitutional Limitations on Public Land Use Controls, to the broad form deed
cases in Kentucky. RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY
1136 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983) (criticizing legal theories that purport to empower clients and
suggesting that the critical legal studies movement has been largely self-defeating).
17. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222
(1984) (suggesting that law teachers with a "nihilist" attitude--that politics matters more than
principle in determining a legal outcome--should discontinue teaching altogether).
18. The notion of a "view from below" is derived from the efforts of clinical legal
educators to expose the "real" dynamics of lawyering and litigation and to incorporate these
insights into the traditional law school curriculum. The phrase also connotes the subordinated existence of clients, and often lawyers, in the hierarchy of the legal profession.
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the formative struggle to tap the experience of lawyers concerned about
social justice and reform in ways that might invigorate current theories
which unfortunately seem to inform much of the practice of lawyers who
share a commitment to social justice. This piece is premised on an
accessible model of power and its impact on people involved in social and
legal reform efforts. These efforts involve citizens in small scale movements of resistance against government and corporations over issues such as
toxic waste dumps, property tax reform, highway siting, community
redevelopment, "right to know" issues, access to health care, and utility rate
cases, to name a few arenas of contemporary struggle. In practically all of
these "petty disturbances,"' 9 the affected community or group has at some
point called on the services of lawyers.
This article will sketch a rough framework for lawyers involved in these
local oppositional disputes. The framework is premised on loose principles
of lawyer interaction and judgment and the effectiveness of lawyer decisionmaking in empowering people embroiled in struggles of resistance. This
article seeks to demonstrate that lawyers do have limited roles in such
disputes, but such roles must be based on a self-reflective and heuristic view
of professional practice.2"
Part III will set out the essential elements of a model of power that
illuminates the repressive features of control and manipulation that often
characterize citizen struggles. This model is drawn from Steven Lukes's
Power: A Radical View 2 and John Gaventa's Power and Powerlessness.2
Part IV of this article will recount a campaign of reform in Appalachia that
failed for decades in part because lawyers came to dominate the reform
effort. This long-standing dispute, which centered on the broad form
mineral deed in Kentucky, serves as an example of the strong tendencies of
law reform toward what I deem "legitimation,"' or of how well-intentioned
reform, which does not heed the lessons of power, can turn to illusion. Part
V of the article will conclude with generalizations sketching the contours of
a lawyer's role premised on reflective and heuristic lawyering. This image,
I hope, can be feasibly implemented in a manner consistent with a broader
19. Roberto Unger used this expressive term:
For us, law practice should be, and to some extent always is, the legal defense of
individual or group interests by methods that reveal the specificity of the underlying
institutional and imaginative order, that subject it to a series of petty disturbances
capable of escalating at any moment, and that suggest alternative ways of defining
collective interests, collective identities, and assumptions about the possible.
Unger, supra note 16, at 667.
20. The image of a reflective practitioner was compellingly created in DONALD A.
SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1983).
21. STEVEN LuKEs, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
22. GAVENTA, supra note 1.
23. For brilliant analysis of the concept of legitimacy, see Alan Hyde, The Concept
of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379.
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vision of social justice and the roles that lawyers actually play in efforts to
achieve democratic reform at the grassroots level.
HI. POWER AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more
than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways, the
behaviour of the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may disguise
the true realities of power, but, at the same time, they may curb that power
and check its intrusions. And it is often from within that very rhetoric that
a radical critique of the practice of the society is developed ....
Social theorists have long grappled with the concept of power and its
impact on both citizen action and inaction. An essential question in these
theories persistently emerges: what prompts citizens, who have been
adversely affected by government or corporate action, to mobilize opposition? Phrased differently, what processes empower people to resist government or corporate decisions that harm their perceived or inchoate interests?
Modem scholars concerned about issues of social injustice have extended
the traditional analyses of power. In their books, John Gaventa and Stephen
Lukes have formulated dimensions of power that explore the mechanisms
of control inherent in situations of conflict.25 For lawyers representing
citizens in these episodes, the model of power developed by Lukes and
Gaventa supplies needed guidance and suggests the limits and possibilities
of legal assistance in these local struggles.
According to Lukes and Gaventa, power can be understood in three
dimensions.26 In the one-dimensional approach to understanding power,
power is analyzed in classically pluralist terms." Citizens perceive their
interests, understand the harm that a particular action will entail upon their
interests, work through the recognized channels of political and legal
redress, and ultimately, achieve their predetermined ends.28 Because the
arenas of redress are thought to be open to any organized faction, passivity
or non-participation is viewed as irrational or inefficient behavior.29 As
Gaventa writes, "[t]he empirical relationship of low socio-economic status
to low participation gets explained away [by the pluralists] as the apathy,

24.
(1975).
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265
See GAVENTA, supra note 1; LUKEs, supra note 21.
GAVENTA. supra note 1, at 4; LUKES, supranote 21, at 10.
GAVENTA, supra note 1, at 5; LuKES, supra note 21, at 10.
GAVENTA, supra note I, at 5-6.
Id. at 7.
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political inefficacy, cynicism or alienation of the impoverished."3 In this
first approach, conflict is visible and outcomes are determined by bargaining
among political actors; votes, jobs, and influence are the grist of power.3
Within this analytical construct, lawyers play traditional roles. They are
thought of as brokers of community power who wield their specialized
influence on behalf of any faction that hires them. Here, lawyers assume
the initiative in gathering information, formulating strategies, and articulating
grievances. A typical example is the lawyer for an upper-middle class
neighborhood group opposing a zoning change.
Relying on the pioneering work of E.E. Schattschneider,32 Peter
Bachrach,33 and Morton Baratz,34 Lukes and Gaventa describe the twodimensional concept of power in which the apparatus of power excludes
issues and groups from participation in the political process. In this realm,
elite organizations develop a "mobilization of bias," ' exploiting certain
kinds of conflict and suppressing others.36 According to Schattschneider,37
"[s]ome issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.
Actors in control exercise power by predetermining those issues that are
appropriate for public debate. 38 Should such issues reach the decisionmaking arena, groups in control influence not only the outcome but also the
ultimate implementation of the decision to their benefit.3 ' The focus of a
two-dimensional approach remains on observable processes, even though the
processes may involve less visible "non-decisions" and "non-actions. ' o In
this scheme deprived parties do not participate in public issues, for a variety
of reasons; force, threat of sanctions, co-optation, or manipulation of a rule,
norm, or precedent all pose serious barriers to participation by powerless
groups who, anticipating defeat, may never act.4'
The theories of Bachrach and Baratz, particularly those expressed in
their book, Power and Poverty,42 informed the modem public interest law
movement. Lawyers in this movement viewed themselves as surrogate

30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 13-14.
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Dryden Press 1975) (1960).
33. PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITIsM: A CRITIQUE (1967).
34. PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1970).
35. GAVENTA, supra note 1, at 9; LUKES, supra note 21, at 16. Both authors quote
SCHATTSCHNEIDER,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

supra note 32, at 69.

See sources cited supra note 35.
See id.
See id.
See GAVENTA, supra note 1, at I1-12.
Id.at 14-15.
Id.at 16-17.
BACHRACH & BARATZ, supra note 34.
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representatives of under-represented people. Overcoming the barriers to
participation in decision-making channels that were the exclusive province
of strong, organized corporate interests, public interest lawyers sought to
combine the second face of power with the first face, creating an expanded,
two-dimensional view of power.43 They believed that such a structural
transformation would breathe life into the rhetoric of the traditional
pluralists.
The three-dimensional view of power transcends structure and strictly
observable processes and dwells more on the consciousness of the disenfranchised." A three-dimensional view of power sees elite groups exercising
power over the disenfranchised, shaping the very notion of what is and is
not an issue.45 Visible conflict does not necessarily exist in this dimension.'
Instead, there is latent conflict "in a contradiction between the interests of
those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude."'4
Rather than concentrating on individuals' actions, this approach attempts to
identify the subjective effects of power:
Their identification, one suspects, involves specifying the means through
which power influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict.
This may include the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and
how they are shaped or manipulated in power processes. It may involve
the study of communication of information-both of what is communicated
and how it is done. It may involve a focus upon the means by which
social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as
beliefs or roles in the dominated. It may involve, in short, locating the
power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patterns
that serve to get B to act and believe in a manner in which B otherwise
might not, to A's benefit and B's detriment.4
At bottom, the three-dimensional view of power calls for a multifaceted, contextualized approach to the understanding of social control and
conflict. It seeks "local knowledge," to use anthropologist Clifford Geertz's
concept,49 to illuminate mechanisms that are often only dimly perceived yet

manifestly shape the ability of non-elites to participate in social, economic,
or political conflict.

43. For a discussion of the "two faces" of power, see id.at 3-16.
44. GAVENTA, supra note 1, at 15-16.
45. Id.at 12; LUKEs, supra note 21, at 24.
46. GAVENTA supra note 1, at 12; LUKES, supra note 21, at 24.
47. LUKES, supra note 21, at 24-25 (emphasis omitted).
48. GAVENTA, supra note 1, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
49. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
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In Power and Powerlessness, Gaventa traces a tentative connection
between the three dimensions of power. ° Through a study of the profound
structure of inequality existing in Appalachia, he concludes that the three
dimensions reverberate among themselves to create more power in the
controlling classes and more powerlessness in the non-elite groups: "Power
serves to create power. Powerlessness serves to re-enforce powerlessness.
Power relationships, once established, are self-sustaining."'" To break this
cycle, Gaventa prescribes "a process of issue and action formulation"52 in
which the powerless share grievances among themselves and construct their
own ranking of interests." Next, using resources within their control, the
powerless must take action to create their own agenda and to challenge the
barriers to participation in decision-making that will affect these issues.m
In this process of reallocation, the powerless must constantly be vigilant, for,
until the mechanisms of power are altered, the power holders-whether on
a national or local level-possess the potential to erect new and more
insidious barriers to participation and challenge.
The third dimension of power is relatively unexplored terrain for
lawyers. The intuitive, ephemeral characteristics involved in representing
powerless groups often are subordinated to the more concrete, lasting nature
of legal strategies. A reflective approach to issues of power, hierarchy,
domination, manipulation, and expertise is rare. Because technique often
dominates legal practice, the odds are stacked against a more
phenomenological approach to legal representation. In this post-modem
world, however, progressive practitioners are beginning to detail an image
of law practice faithful to the assumptions underlying the third dimension
of power.
The account in the next section detailing the early legal campaign to
abolish the broad form mineral deed in Kentucky represents a preliminary
attempt to examine critically the influences of power in a legal reform effort.
Undoubtedly, the account suffers from a paucity of detail about some of the
critical events and from the personalized nature of the story as told by a
participant, now observer. Despite these obvious shortcomings, recounting
the broad form deed campaign seems a worthwhile stab at a more selfconscious phenomenology of practice that is at the brink of emerging.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See GAVENTA, supra note I.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 257-58.
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II. LAWYERING FOR PEOPLE IN APPALACHIA: THE CAMPAIGN TO
ABOLISH THE BROAD FORM MINERAL DEED

Sir Henry Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic notion
of property with prescription. But the connection is further back than the
first recorded history. It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which
you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property
or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without
your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by
it. The
law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of
55
man.

Eastern Kentucky is a colony owned and managed by absentee
landlords. When the mineral deeds were signed, sovereignty passed to a
class of wealthy, distant, and aloof people. They have demonstrated a
chilling unconcern for the region during the eighty years since a colonial
status was imposed on an ignorant and gullible population. Today's
mineral landlords, like their predecessors, provide no leadership in solving
the state's problems. Instead, they so burden and oppress beautiful,
resource-rich Kentucky that it is backward and impoverished ......
A. The PoliticalEconomy of Central Appalachia
Central Appalachia is an area of dramatic paradoxes. It is a region
incredibly rich in natural resources-coal, oil, and gas-yet incredibly poor
on any conventional scale; a region with abundant environmental resources,
whose waters are fouled, forests clear-cut, mountains leveled, and species
destroyed; and a region with a heritage of individual and family autonomy,
a collective union identity, and yet, a heavily bureaucratized governmental
infrastructure.
These paradoxes have bred inequality, domination, and much-documented suffering. As John Gaventa has shown in his book, Power and
Powerlessness, the political economy of Central Appalachia is difficult to
justify under traditional democratic theory.57 The contradictions that mark
the region create a web of potential grievances that would appear to demand
grassroots redress.
Yet the deep-seated injustices that characterize the fiber of life in the
mountains have been peculiarly immune to citizen action. Gaventa supplies
part of the reason why the wide social and economic disparities in
Appalachia have remained virtually unassailable. Under the third face of

55.

O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).

56.

HARRY M. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE POWER: THE MOGULS OF EASTERN

KENTUCKY 151 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
57.

GAVENTA, supra note I.
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power, citizens do not act upon seemingly obvious grievances because they
are not recognized as problems, much less correctable ones.58 The
institutional structures that are intended to serve the region's people,
moreover, have shown themselves to be part of the "mobilization of bias"
characteristic of the second face of power.59 Far from promoting reform,
these economic, legal, and political bodies have suppressed nascent change.
In this setting, law as a tool of reform has proven woefully inadequate.
Widespread social and economic phenomena-such as the entrenched
poverty of the region-have overwhelmed the capacity of law and lawyers
to affect the problems. In Appalachia, the impenetrability and the unity of
the legal system play significant roles in maintaining quiescence in the face
of glaring inequalities of wealth and resources. Compounding the situation,
on one level the people of Appalachia are keenly aware of their daily
problems; lack of decent housing, inadequate health care, hunger, and the
inability to influence existing institutions of redress are well known to all.
On this level, law and lawyers have played a marginally ameliorative role.
Much like Sisyphus, the king in Greek mythology who laboriously rolled a
stone up a mountain only to see it roll down again, federally funded legal
services programs have striven to provide individual and group legal
services on a range of discrete issues. In the context of the third face of
power, the elite dominate the disenfranchised, and many grievances and
suggested paths for solutions have not been considered appropriate subjects
for entry into the legal arena, even assuming its availability and fairness.
Ownership and control of land in Appalachia represent issues mired in
power relationships. Land ownership, where it can be traced, is heavily
concentrated in the hands of corporations, many of them energy conglomerates based outside the region. Only recently has the extent of outside
ownership been documented in Who Owns Appalachia?:Landownershipand
Its Impact.60 The Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force, a grassroots
citizen project, documented land holding patterns and their impact on issues
such as property taxation, economic development, housing, and the
environment. 6' Unique because the prodigious archival research was
conducted almost exclusively by "lay citizens, '62 the study traced the extent
of corporate and absentee ownership of surface and mineral rights in eighty
Appalachian counties in six states.63 The results confirmed the perceived
understanding of the problems. "Of the 13 million acres of surface sampled,

58.
59.

See, e.g., id. at 19-20.
See, e.g., id. at 9.

60. APPALACHIAN LAND OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, WHO OWNS APPALACHIA?:
LANDOWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT (1983).
61. See Charles C. Geisler, Introduction to APPALACHIAN LAND OWNERSHIP TASK
FORCE, WHO OWNS APPALACHIA?: LANDOWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT, at xxviii-xxix (1983).

62.
63.

Id. at x-xi.
id. at 14-15.
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72 percent ...were owned by absentee owners; 47 percent [of the 72
percent] by out-of-state owners; and ...[the rest] by owners residing out
of the county of their holdings." Eighty percent of the mineral rights were
in the hands of absentee owners. 65 "Almost 40 percent of the land in the
[survey], and 70 percent of the mineral rights, [were] corporately
held.... [by] some of the largest corporations in the country."
As observed by the Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force, the issue
of land ownership is complicated by the formidable system (or nonsystem)
of land titles that exists in county seat courthouses throughout the mountains. 67 Land titles are often impossible to trace. When a presumptively
accurate chain of title is found, it often conflicts with the local understanding of ownership. Suits to quiet title--often pitting absentee corporate
owners against indigenous landowners-are a staple of the mountain courts.
At the apex of the issue of landownership is the broad form mineral
deed. This instrument, which severs minerals in land from the surface, is
extremely common in central Appalachia. This genre of deed, drafted in the
late 1800s and early 1900s by coal and land companies, almost completely
subordinates the surface estate in land to the mineral estate. The broad form
mineral deed is also called the long form deed, because of its length and
complexity, or the Mayo deed, after John C.C. Mayo, who purchased
prodigious tracts of mineral rights for coal companies around 1900. The
deed purported to confer on the holder of the mineral estate the right to use
the surface estate in any way necessary or convenient for the recovery of
minerals.68 However, the right to recover minerals by strip-mining-with
its consequent damage to the surface estate-was not expressly contained in
the typical broad form mineral deed, nor could it have been in light of the
coal extraction technology in use during that time.
Although the broad form mineral deed, in various guises, existed
throughout the states comprising the eastern coalfields, the story of the
reform effort to abolish the deed is most sharply highlighted in Kentucky,
the East's major coal state. Longer than any of their neighbors, the people
of Kentucky have endured the consequences of the broad form deed and
have engaged in identifiable campaigns against the deed.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136-37.
For a discussion and history of the deed, see RONALD D. ELLER, MINERS,

MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE APPALACHIAN SOUTH,

1880-

1930 (1982); John E. Bailey, Disruptions to Peaceful Coexistence of Surface Owner and
Mineral Lessee, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 154 (1969); Robert M. Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New
Broad Form Deed Law-Is It Constitutional?, I J.MIN. L. & POL'Y 57 (1985); Michael V.
Withrow, Comment, Broad-Form Deed--Obstacle to Peaceful Co-existence Between Mineral
and Surface Owners, 60 KY. L.J. 742 (1972).
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I have been part of that effort, directly or indirectly, since 1970.
Distancing myself from this issue and my role as advocate is, I concede,
impossible. But, with Frank Munger and Carroll Seron, I believe:
The principal question in research is thus how one overcomes one's
own historical blinders so that the product of one's work does not reflect
only the limited perspective of group ideology. The researcher must be
involved in a process of self-criticism, i.e, a process of reflection about
one's own basic predispositions and assumptions. The scholar is not an
outsider to social activities. 69
The following account aspires to capture this methodological tension.
B. 'Lawing"Against the Broad Form Deed in Kentucky

70

In the late 1800s, the mountains of Eastern Kentucky were invaded by
land agents seeking to acquire the mineral rights to the millions of acres of
coal-rich land that existed throughout the eastern coal counties. These
agents, often representing landholding companies located in eastern financial
centers, transacted business with small landowners who devoted most of
their property to farming and other nonexploitive uses. The broad form
deed was the centerpiece of the thousands of small transactions that were
recorded in county courthouses."
As early as 1892, Kentucky courts acknowledged the gross disparity in
bargaining power embodied in the typical broad form deed deal.72 As
recounted in one case:
In August, 1887, the appellant, John Wollums, was living upon his
mountain farm of about 200 acres in Bell county. He was then about 60
years old, uneducated, afflicted with disease disabling him from work,
owned no other land, and but very little personal property. He knew but
little of what was going on in the business world, owing to his situation
and circumstances in life. He moved in a small circle. At this time the
appellee, W. J. Horsley, who was then a man of large and varied experience in business, who was then buying mineral rights in that locality by the
thousands of acres, and who was evidently familiar with all that was then
going on and near at hand in the way of business and development in that

69.

Frank Munger & Carroll Seron, Critical Legal Studies Versus Critical Legal

Theory: A Comment on Method, 6 LAw & POL'Y 257, 276 (1984).
70. The use of "law" as a verb is common in Appalachian parlance. It signifies

going to court to resolve a dispute.
71. See ELLER, supra note 68, at 39-57.
72. See, e.g., Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781 (Ky. 1892).
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section, through his agent entered into a contract with the appellant, which
was signed by the latter only, by which he sold to Horsley all the oils,
gases, and minerals in his land, with customary mining privileges, for 40
cents per acre ....

... The appellee [mineral buyer] shows pretty plainly by his own
testimony that when the contract was made he was advised of the
probability of the building of a railroad in that locality in the near future.
His agent, when the trade was made, assured the appellant that he would
never be bothered by the contract during his lifetime. He was lulled in the
belief that the Rip Van Winkle sleep of that locality in former days was to
continue, and the grossly inadequate price of this purchase can only be
that the appellant was misled and acted
accounted for upon the ground
3
under gross misapprehension.1
The agents for the land and coal companies did their jobs well. It is my
recollection that title to the minerals underlying some ninety percent of the
land in the Kentucky counties of Bell, Harlan, Letcher, Perry, Knott, Pike,
and Floyd was severed from the surface by broad form deeds.
With the rise of the coal industry in Kentucky at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the firms that had purchased minerals under broad form
deeds leased these rights to a multitude of coal operators-some local, but
many from companies outside the region.74 At the time that the vast
majority of broad form deeds were executed, the grantor-surface owners
could not have anticipated the technological revolution that would take place
in coal mining over the years. In the early years, coal was removed mostly
through underground shafts and tunnels. Disturbances to the surface were
relatively minor.75
As technology evolved, the strip-mining industry became mechanized.76
Giant bulldozers, high lifts, trucks, and powerful explosives transformed the
industry, allowing more efficient recovery of seams of coal. The impact of
strip-mining activities on the environment of Eastern Kentucky was severe.
The once pristine mountains were marred, streams and rivers were degraded,

73. Id. at 781, 782. For a classic description of the broad form deed transaction, see
Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 422 U.S. 1012, 1014 n.3 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from a denial of certiorari and quoting HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO
THE CUMBERLANDS:

A BIOGRAPHY

OF A DEPRESSED

AREA

72-74 (1963)).

For an

illuminating depiction of the injustices suffered by Kentucky surface owners because of the
broad form deed and their struggle to protect their land and their livelihood, see ON OUR
OWN LAND (Appalshop Film & Video 1988) (on file with author).
74. See id. at 20-22.
75. DUANE LOcKARD, COAL: A MEMOIR AND CRITIQUE 36-50 (1998).
76. For an excellent account of the evolution of strip-mining in Kentucky, see MARC
KARNIS LANDY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM: CONTROLLING KENTUCKY
STRIP MINING (1976).
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soil was indiscriminately removed and never replaced, mountains were
shaved off at the top, trees and vegetation were ruined, and wildlife was
harmed.77 But perhaps the most telling legacy of the strip-mining industry
was the consequence to mountain residents.
As the strip-mining industry grew and its effects on the land and the
overall environment became more pronounced, conflicts between surface
owners and mineral owners became increasingly prevalent. Since the
beginning of the twentieth century, surface owners have intermittently
resorted to the courts in actions sounding in nuisance, trespass, and contract.
In these early cases, the landowners were almost uniformly rebuffed by the
courts. Justice William 0. Douglas, in a dissent from denial of certiorari in
a Kentucky broad form deed case in 1975,78 captured the attitude of the
local courts:
With the advance of technology, however, the stakes increased; each
successive innovation was visited upon the mountaineers with the approval
of the courts, which found these new and unforeseen techniques to fall
within the scope of the aged and yellowing deeds. Judicial decisions gave
virtually untrammeled powers to the coal companies, so long as they acted
without malice ....79
The watershed case validating the broad form deed was Buchanan v.
Watson,80 decided by the then Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1956." On its
face, Buchanan held that, despite the trial court's finding of fact that the
parties to the deed did not contemplate strip-mining, "[t]o deny the right to
remove [the coal] by the only feasible process is to defeat the principal
purpose of the deed." 2 The mining company would not be liable for
damages to the surface owner unless it performed work in an arbitrary,
wanton, or malicious manner.83 The court closed with a classic embodiment
of judicial abdication:
The rule has become so firmly established that it is a rule of property
law governing the rights under many mineral deeds covering much acreage
in Eastern Kentucky. To disturb this rule now would create great
confusion and much hardship in a segment of an industry that can ill-afford
such a blow. It is especially desirable that the law of property rights
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See APPALACHIAN LAND OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, supra note 60, at 121-25.
Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 422 U.S. 1012 (1975).
Id.at 1015.
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
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Id.at 42.
id.at 43.

1999]

LA WYERING, POWER, AND REFORM

should remain stable after it has been settled. The doctrine of stare decisis
requires that we do not depart from the established rule. 4
By the 1960s, the spread of strip-mining, the increasing public
awareness of its harms, and the intransigence of the courts and legislature
on issues affecting the coal industry led individuals to undertake direct
action. Protests by surface owners proliferated. 5 Some protested stripmining by blocking the entrance to their properties.8 6 Landowners waged
near-guerilla warfare with strip-mine operators.8 7 Through the aggregation
of individual acts of defiance in county after county, a movement began.
To contain these protests, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the
first purportedly comprehensive bill to regulate the environmental effects of
strip-mining in 1965.8 The law established a crude regulatory apparatus
that never worked, in large part because the standards contained in the law
were too cosmetic, the regulatory agency with the responsibility for
enforcing the law was immediately "captured," and the coal industry,
undoubtedly knowing the law had more rhetoric than bite, engaged in
massive resistance to the scheme's requirements."' Although the bill barely
dented the external costs associated with strip-mining, public officials seized
on its passage as evidence of progress. Collectively, the people in the
mountains knew otherwise.
Spurred by continuing reports of landslides, water pollution, erosion, and
the acts of resistance that dramatized the problem, an all-out effort was
launched in the late 1960s to obtain judicial nullification of the broad form
deed. This was the first organized effort to strike at the deed. A coalition
of organizations, including the Appalachian Group to Save the Land and
People, the Sierra Club, and even the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union,
challenged the broad form deed on a variety of contractual theories ranging
from standard judicial construction of deeds to contracts of adhesion to
estoppel.' This unusual coalition, employing the public interest strategies
of civil rights and civil liberties organizations, chose a single case on which
to hinge its challenge.9
84. Id. at 43-44 (citation omitted). In Buchanan, the court of appeals took the
extraordinary step of reversing itself on the strength of a petition for rehearing filed by the
coal industry. Id. at 40.
85.
account of
86.
87.
POST, Jan.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See generally HARRY M. CAUDILL, MY LAND IS DYING (1971) (providing an
surface owners' efforts to curb strip-mining).
Id. at 80.
See, e.g., Peter Milius, Kentuckians Risk Lives in War on Strip-Mining, WASH.
31, 1972, at A 1, A6.
E.g., LANDY, supra note 76, at 39-40.
Id. at 194-203.
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
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The time seemed right. The abuses of strip-mining continued unabated
despite the existence of the Kentucky regulatory scheme. Individual protests
continued, with violence occasionally erupting between surface owners and
strip-miners, and the problem was discovered by the national media.'
Technological advances in mining equipment allowed the industry to mine
ever-deeper seams in more remote locations.93 The frontal attack on the
broad form deed in the courts seemed like a logical step to defuse the
mounting problems.
In 1968, however, this broad-based coalition suffered a major defeat.
In Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co.,94 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
rebuffed every argument presented by the groups involved in the litigation."
First, the court rationalized that conservation was not at issue because a
decision abrogating the broad form deed would not pro tanto halt stripmining."6 In rejecting the validity of the environmental arguments raised by
the challengers, the court failed to recognize that thousands of acres would
be withdrawn from strip-mining because surface owners would regain
possession of the bundle of property rights encompassing this technique of
mineral removal. The court appeared almost to tease the groups, suggesting
that the outright abolition of strip-mining was the only environmentally
sound solution.
Second, the court redefied the basic property/contractual issue in the
case: "Whether or not the parties actually contemplated or envisioned strip
or auger mining is not important-the question is whether they intended that
the mineral owner's rights to use the surface in removal of the minerals
'
would be superior to any competing right of the surface owner."97
This
startling reasoning, rejecting the proposition that the intention of the parties
to a contract should prevail, flew in the face of decisions by every other
coal-state court that had decided the issue up to that time. 9
Finally, the court adduced a variety of allegedly historical reasons-including the low value of the land and the lack of productive
agricultural acreage in the mountains-to support its dubious conclusion that
the original land owners, by obtaining "full value" for their land, deceived
the land companies, not that the land companies had deceived the original
land owners. The court stated:

92. See Mary Beth Bingham, Stopping the Bulldozers: What Difference Did it
Make?, in FIGHTING BACK IN APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 17,
21 (Stephen L. Fisher ed., 1993).
93. See LOCKARD, supra note 75, at 45.
94. 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
95. Id. at 397-99.
96. Id. at 397.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1954); West Va.-Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
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If, as appears well may have been the case, the landowners who
executed the broad form mineral deeds at the turn of the century were paid
prices which substantially or in large part equaled the full value of the land
(at least of the hillside land) we see nothing unfair, unjust or inequitable
in construing the deeds in favor of the grantees. Certainly the fact that the
surface of the land is worth much more today than it was in 1905 is not
a valid reason for saying that the landowners should be paid again."
Justice Edward P. Hill, who hailed from the heart of Eastern Kentucky,
vigorously dissented."° Citing the court's perversion of the proper rule of
deed construction'' and the role of stare decisis, the treatment of broad form
deeds in other coal states, the "catastrophe" of strip-mining,0 2 and the
historical errors in the majority opinion-e.g., the fact that property values
in Kentucky were only assessed for tax purposes at ten to fifteen percent of
their value'° 3 -Justice Hill concluded:
I am shocked and appalled that the court of last resort in the beautiful
state of Kentucky would ignore the logic and reasoning of the great
majority of other states and lend its approval and encouragement to the
diabolical devastation and destruction of a large part of the surface of this
fair state without compensation to the owners thereof.'
One cannot read the Martin case without being struck by its truculent
defense of the interests of the coal industry and by its primitive marshalling
of legal concepts to support what seemed to be a predetermined conclusion.
When I arrived in the mountains, first as a law student in 1970 and then
as a legal services lawyer with the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund
in 1972, Martin loomed as an enormous obstacle to meaningful reform of
the broad form deed and strip-mining. Much local energy, through groups
such as the Letcher County Citizens League to Protect Surface Rights and
the Appalachian Group to Save the Land and the People, was devoted to
discussions with legal services and other sympathetic lawyers about
continuing legal challenges to the deep-seated problem. There was little
explicit recognition in the years following Martin that the legal confrontation
over the broad form deed, as well as the strenuous efforts on behalf of
citizens in the enactment of the Kentucky strip-mining law, deflected the
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course of citizen self-help into arenas that were dominated by the very
interests whose power was at stake. Frankfort, the state capital, was viewed
as the crucible where change might occur. Very little attention was paid to
actions, such as zoning or land use schemes, that might be taken on a city
or county level." 5
Through the early 1970s, the movement to negate the broad form deed
continued almost with a momentum of its own. It was as if the rhetoric that
was always employed in discussions about this issue, centering on concepts
such as empowerment, self-determination, and justice, demanded some type
of concrete action. The groups and individuals for which we worked never
flagged in their zeal to find solutions to the problem. But with the legal
course already charted, fresh alternatives failed to materialize. Strong
believers in traditional democracy, the challengers, having lost in court,
turned to the Kentucky legislature.
In the legislative forum, our clients believed that it would be more
difficult for individual legislators to mask their interests behind what passed
for neutral principles in adjudication. The rightness of the cause, moreover,
would sway at least those legislators who had no direct interest in coal.
Accordingly, a lobbying campaign was mounted. Mountain citizens came
to Frankfort to deliver eloquent testimony about the hardships that flowed
from the broad form deed. They tried to convince legislators that the
Kentucky high court had placed this entire problem in the lap of the
legislature and that this body could act to overturn the Buchanan and Martin
decisions.
As thorough tactitioners, we appealed on every front. For example, we
argued that, no matter where the initial entitlement to the minerals was
placed, in most instances bargaining between the surface owner and mineral
owner was inevitable. This bargaining, it was reasoned, would ultimately
lead to efficient market outcomes because it would allow the surface owner
to value the full external costs of strip-mining. Strip-mined coal, therefore,
would be priced at its full market value, shorn of externalities. Not
surprisingly, efficient market outcomes were not the first priority of most
legislators.
The upshot of the citizen-led, lawyer-informed efforts was the passage
of a bill by the 1974 Kentucky General Assembly requiring the written
consent of the surface owner as a precondition to the issuance of a strip-

105. On behalf of citizens in one Eastern Kentucky county, I recall researching the
legitimacy of county land use controls to protect surface owners from strip-mining on their
property. Because meaningful local controls seemed to conflict with the state's strip-mining
control law, we had serious concerns about the viability of a meaningful county-level
scheme. The Kentucky River Area Development District, an entity created at the behest of
the Appalachian Regional Commission, acknowledged the impossibility of engaging in
planning for land use or economic development as long as the broad form deed governed
land-holding patterns in Eastern Kentucky.
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mining permit."° Although the bill had been tinkered with in committee,
we believed that the consent mechanism was constitutionally appropriate.
The expected coal industry challenge would have to surmount the strong
justifications for this bill, which ranged from environmental, to planning, to
public safety considerations. In the end, the legislation passed overwhelmingly, a signal to some that trouble lay ahead.
Within months after the effective date of the legislation, the coal
industry's legal challenge was mounted. It was led by a Louisville lawyer
named Bert Combs, a named partner in one of Kentucky's largest firms, a
former governor of Kentucky, a former judge of the United States Court of
Appeals, and a former justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Along with
lawyers from the State Attorney General's office, we labored to defend the
legislation.
Our defense of the law was premised on the legislature's unquestioned
power to alleviate the demonstrably harmful consequences that the broad
form deed embodied. Relying on this power, we sought to show that the
industry's challenge, based as it was on the contracts clauses of both the
state and federal constitutions, could be punctured by the legitimate exercise
of legislative authority that undergirded the broad form deed bill. We
argued that, if the Minnesota legislature could enact a mortgage moratorium
in 1936,107 surely the Kentucky legislature could modify the broad form
mineral deed. We also carefully rebuffed the "taking" argument made by
the industry. In so doing, we exercised pains to distinguish Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,"°8 a 1922 United States Supreme Court case that
invalidated a statute forbidding the mining of coal by methods that would
cause substantive damage to homes.' 9 After full briefing before the lower
court, we felt confident that our doctrinal arguments were sound and that,
unlike in Martin, we had the force of the state behind us.

106. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.060(8) (overturned by Department for Natural
Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Va., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975)). The
statute read as follows:
Each application [for a strip-mining permit] shall ... be accompanied by a statement
of consent to have strip mining conducted upon the area of land described in the
application for a permit. The statement of consent shall be signed by each holder of a
freehold interest in such land. Each signature shall be notarized. No permit shall be
issued if the application therefor is not accompanied by the statement of consent.

Id.
107. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437-38
(1934) (holding that the constitutional prohibition against impairment of obligation of
contracts is not absolute and may give way to a state's legitimate exercise of its police

power).
108. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). We distinguished Pennsylvania Coal by emphasizing the
total destruction to surface property caused by strip-mining.
109. Id.
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Following oral argument, in which Bert Combs stressed the havoc this
bill would wreak on the ailing Kentucky coal industry, the lower court
invalidated the bill on constitutional grounds.10 Short on reasoning and
documentation, the lower court decision, reciting the various bare provisions
of the federal and state constitutions, simply declared that the broad form
deed bill was unconstitutional."' When we received word of the decision,
we immediately conferred with our clients in the mountains. For a few
moments, we felt that we were the only people in Kentucky who did not
realize that the process of enacting this legislation may have been a charade.
The more conspiratorial among us felt that the bill was passed on the tacit
assurance that it would be invalidated in court.
This real exercise of power by the coal industry did not deter us from
appealing the case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which was then
Kentucky's high court. In 1975, the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court decision in Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia 112 After reciting the malleable
generalities about the limits of the police power,' 3 the court found that
subsection 8 failed to further any public purpose." 4 "In order to be
justified," the court stated, "it must stand as an evironmental [sic] conservation measure.""' 5 Under Martin, this purpose, of course, did not exist." 6
The court concluded, therefore, that subsection 8 was really only a Robin
Hood measure that took from the rich to give to the poor, an obviously
illegitimate state purpose:
Subsection 8 delegates to countless private individuals who own
interests in surface estates from which the mineral has been severed the
right to undo whatever environmental conservation purpose the legislation
may have by granting their consent, for a consideration, to surface mining
on their land. It is beyond cavil that the primary purpose and effect of
subsection 8 is to change the relative legal rights and economic bargaining
positions of many private parties under their contracts rather than achieve
any public purpose. It is, therefore, axiomatic that subsection 8 is
unconstitutional." 17

110. Department for Natural Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Va., 528
S.W.2d 684, 685 (Ky. 1975).
I1l.
id.at 685-86.
112. 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky 1975).
113. Id. at 686.
114. Id.at 686-87.
115. Id. at 686.
116. See supra text accompanying note 96.
117. No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia, 528 S.W.2d at 686-87.
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The decision in No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia represented the second major
setback in seven years. In strategy sessions following the court's decision,
our clients questioned whether any legal avenues remained to pierce the
court's reasoning. As good lawyers, true to our craft, we held out hope.
We concluded that, in the 1976 Kentucky legislature, legislation should be
drafted prescribing a rule of construction for the courts to use in interpreting
broad form mineral deeds. The legislation should simply state that the
intention of the parties to the deed when the surface and mineral rights were
severed should control. If strip-mining were intended, the broad form deed
would encompass the right to recover coal by this method. If, by resort to
the language of the deed or to extrinsic evidence, strip-mining was not or
could not have been intended, the holder of the mineral rights would be
prohibited from recovering coal through this method.
By 1976, the momentum on the broad form deed had flagged.
Developments in Washington toward the passage of a federal strip-mining
law, however, kept up our hope that the broad form deed problem could be
solved. With the assistance of lobbyists from the Environmental Policy
Institute, a national environmental organization, key individuals long active
in the Kentucky campaign sought to insert a provision in the federal
legislation that would effectively require the consent of the surface owner
prior to the issuance of a strip-mining permit.
This initiative was narrowly rejected in the bargaining over the federal
bill, but in 1977 the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA)" 8 was enacted. SMCRA created a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that, for the first time, promised to curb the patent abuses of stripmining in the mountains. It also contained a variety of unprecedented
provisions allowing citizen involvement in the permitting and enforcement
phases of the new administrative process.' 9
The passage of SMCRA was met with cautious optimism by anti-stripmining activists in the mountains. Despite the legislation's detailed
specifications of permissible mining practices, the vigilant enforcement of
such specific regulatory requirements in an industry noted for numerous,
small, and geographically widespread operators was crucial to the law's
objective of internalizing the impacts associated with strip-mining. Of even
greater concern was SMCRA's failure to address the broad form deed issue,
which many continued to believe was the chief obstacle to local land reform
and economic self-determination in the mountains. While activity in
Kentucky remained largely dormant following the decision in No. 8 Ltd. of
Virginia, a coalfield organization based in Tennessee-Save Our
Cumberland Mountains (SOCM)--launched a campaign to abolish the broad
form deed in Tennessee. Learning from the Kentucky experience, SOCM
drafted a bill that embodied the rule of deed construction that appeared to
118.

30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).

119.

See generally id.
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be the only course left after No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia. Responding to an
effective grass-roots lobbying strategy, the Tennessee legislature enacted the
Tennessee Surface Owner Protection Act in 1977.120 The Act established a
rebuttable presumption declaring that, in interpreting broad form deeds that
do not expressly specify strip-mining as a method of mineral extraction, it
shall be presumed that the method of extraction that was intended by the
parties was the method prevailing at the time the parties originally entered
into the deed.' As in Kentucky, the law was promptly challenged by stripmining interests, who claimed that it violated the contracts, taking, and equal
protection clauses of the United States and Tennessee
Constitutions and
22
contravened the principle of separation of powers.
23
In 1981, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Doochin v. Rackley1
unanimously upheld the Act. 24 In contrast to Kentucky, the Court premised
its ruling on the environmental harms caused by strip-mining: "Strip mining
can be hazardous to the environment, to agriculture, and even to human
safety.... Strip mining temporarily or permanently destroys the surface of
the land, depending on the success of reclamation efforts. Thus, strip
25
mining is incompatible with the surface owner's enjoyment of his estate."'
Recognizing that strip-mining was unknown in the locale when the
severance of minerals from the surface occurred during the 1920s and 1930s
under the deeds at issue in the case, the court had little difficulty holding26
that the Act did not impair the contractual rights of the mineral holder.'
The mineral holder, the court reasoned, did not possess the right
27 to stripmine unless this method was expressly contained in the deed.
The Doochin decision sparked renewed efforts in Kentucky. Led by the
incipient Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, a membership-based organization of
citizens throughout the coalfields dedicated to local control of issues
affecting economic development and the environment, the proponents of
legislation included greater emphasis in their advocacy on the broad form
deed's adverse impact on economic development. A bill based on the
Tennessee Act was introduced in the Kentucky General Assembly in 1980
and fell one vote shy of passing. The grass-roots campaign persisted, and
finally in 1984, a new Kentucky broad form deed law was enacted. 28

120. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-102 (1993).
121. Id. § 66-5-102(a).
122. See Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1981).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 719.
125. Id.at 717.
126. Id. at 719.
127. Id.
128. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.930-.945 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998) (KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. section 381.940 was declared unconstitutional in Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d
294 (Ky. 1987)).
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Predictably, the law was challenged by the coal industry which claimed that
the legislation circumvented the court's rulings in Buchanan, Martin, and
No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia. 9 History was about to repeat itself. 30
C. The Broad Fonn Deed Campaign and the Dynamics of Power
In the years following Buchanan, the legal campaign to abolish the
broad form deed was an unqualified failure in the courts. For almost thirty
years, the issue largely remained in the hands of the lawyers and organizers.
Predictably, these strategists turned to the courts to promote change. This
forum was stubbornly resistant to the citizens' efforts.
By concentrating the broad form deed campaign in this arena, the
reformers lost control of the issue. They allowed the courts, for example,
to define the issue in a manner completely inconsistent with the people's
experiences with the deed.. To claim, as the court did in No. 8 Ltd. of
Virginia, that the broad form deed issue did not implicate environmental
concerns shifted the debate away from the central issues of land ownership.
The responsibility for this litigation strategy lay largely with the lawyers
(myself included), who advised the citizen groups over the years. There was
insufficient emphasis on the need to build a political base of citizen support
to complement, supplement, and eventually supplant the legal strategy.
Eventually, such a movement emerged, but late in the day.
Why did the broad form deed issue not generate more broad-based
conflict in the 1960s and 1970s? Why did the affected citizens rely so
heavily on lawyers and courts? Were alternative avenues of protest and
action available? In their model of power, Lukes and Gaventa provide
perspectives on these questions.
First, the "legalization" of the broad form deed issue ensured that the
controversy would remain in the very arena-the courts-that, in Buchanan
and Martin, had perverted the definition of the issue in the first place. Even
with the most conscientious counsel-and we were-citizens confronted real
barriers to full participation in the judicial forum. In Kentucky, judges are
elected, and the coal industry contributes heavily to their re-election. The
economics of practice, moreover, assure that the coal industry employs a
sizable number of lawyers, including many prominent members of the bar.
The choice of Bert Combs to represent the industry in No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia
was not an accident.
Also, the explicit invocation of concern for the economic health of the
coal industry in Buchanan contrasted sharply with the absence of similar
solicitude for the problems of surface owners. The judicial arena, by
constricting the scope of the debate, erected obstacles to a full airing of the

129. See Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 294.
130. My original paper ended here in approximately 1985. The epilogue below traces
the subsequent history of the 1984 legislation.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:467

issues. In this setting, even the best Brandeis brief would have been
fruitless. These features of the controversy combined to block meaningful
participation by citizens in the judicial evolution of the campaign. The
mobilization of bias that inheres in the second dimension of power was
manifest throughout the campaign.
Second, the over-reliance on lawyers in the movement itself constituted
a different form of the mobilization of bias. Despite the best of intentions,
we continued to hold out hope that the issue could be resolved in yet
another case. The rhetoric of rights in the face of this massive injustice
infected our advice to clients and our own perspectives on their concerns.
Defeat inexorably led to another creative rights-based strategy, while the
consequences of the delay in implementing another new strategy were never
fully considered. Tackling the broad form deed challenged our craft, and
we took refuge in what became a false intellectual duel. Each time we
received a report of yet another incident of abuse of the broad form deed,
our energies were renewed-but in the same grooves. We too fell prey to
the legal system's ability to co-op the bursts of momentum that spontaneously erupted over this issue, and we naively celebrated when seeming
advances-e.g., SMCRA--occurred.
Third, as noted by Gaventa, "the second dimension of power serves to
enhance and re-enforce the third-dimensional power relationship."' 3 Itis
within the third dimension of power that the futility of the legal campaign
to abrogate the broad form deed became more fully exposed. By shaping
the definition of the issue, the courts and lawyers for both sides subtly
influenced the perceptions of people involved in the dispute. More
importantly, many of the numerous small landowners affected by the broad
form deed, undoubtedly sensing the prospect of defeat or the pretextuality
of apparent victory, never became involved in the overall campaign. The
ability of the powerful to obscure the central issues of absentee, unequal
land ownership and taxation patterns diverted citizen attention away from
the core concerns for years. The 1983 study by the Appalachian Landownership Task Force was the first systematic attempt to gather regional data on
a multitude of issues of which the broad form deed was only a symbol.
Under Gaventa's scheme, the narrowly-defined broad form deed issue
"emerged," only to be blocked in the second dimension of power. The
reverberations from these defeats infiltrated the ability of affected persons
to act on issues that, in the long run, more directly affected their welfare.
Here, the experience in Tennessee has been illustrative.
Despite the passage of the 1977 Surface Owner Protection Act,' small
landowners in Tennessee have been plagued by the brooding cloud on their
title flowing from the broad form deed severance itself. Many are uncertain
as to whether their title is bona fide, are unable to acquire financing to make
131.
132.

GAVENTA, supra note I, at 255.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-102 (1993).
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improvements to their property, and are generally helpless to influence the
course of mineral development in their communities. Organized by SOCM,
these land owners were forced to devise strategies to combat these deepseated inequities. Having "succeeded" in 1980, they formulated legislation
to create a mechanism where, under specified
conditions, the surface and
3
mineral estates to land would be reunited. 1 3
Faithful to the third dimension of power, even this strategy failed to
confront the fundamental issue of outside corporate ownership of minerals
in depressed areas such as Central Appalachia. By concentrating on the
broad form mineral deed, strategists suppressed more far-reaching political
strategies rooted in local communities. Although the campaign to abolish
the broad form deed helped generate information for citizens to use, the
legal effort retarded more innovative approaches to pressing problems and
inhibited more direct expressions of people's grievances. These grievances
will continue to linger until the relationships of power described by Gaventa
are better understood. The concluding section of this article will sketch the
role lawyers might play in such a transformation.
V. TOWARD AN IMAGE OF PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING
The model of power relationships proposed by Gaventa, combined with
the lessons from the broad form deed controversy, suggests tentative paths
to guide lawyers in reform representation. In such local protests, there is
genuine potential for the realization of democratic participation among
heterogeneous people united in opposition to oppressive state or corporate
action. The frequent involvement of lawyers in these disputes, however, is
a cause for caution. Often inadvertently, as in the broad form deed
campaign, lawyers' advice becomes reified without critical analysis of the
underlying causes of the disturbance that mobilized people in the first place.
Such advice, and the manner in which it is given, can seriously misdirect a
citizen-initiated campaign of reform. Assuming the continued involvement
of lawyers in these efforts, what are the implications of a power-sensitive
role?
First, lawyers must pay careful attention to the information that is
generated in the dispute and, most importantly, to the process by which such
information is gathered. To the extent possible, citizens must ensure that
they do not give control of the effort to the "expert" advice of a lawyer.
One characteristic of citizen disturbances is the extent to which data
influence the controversy and mold people's perceptions of appropriate
strategies. Information generated by the participants themselves serves as
a vital check on expert dominance.

133. See id. § 66-5-108 (providing for the preservation, or extinguishment and
reversion, of mineral interests). This section was enacted in 1987.
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The Appalachian Landownership Task Force study is a prime example
of the kind of citizen-guided effort that should have complemented the broad
form deed campaign from the beginning. By removing the generation of
expertise from the lawyer, citizens gained valuable experience in one of the
crucial mechanisms of control. The importance of this experience is
heightened in controversies permeated by risk, such as in the environmental
arena, where judgments are best made by affected parties.
In the context of litigation, this approach would translate into assurances
that clients meaningfully participate in all phases of investigation and
discovery.
Seemingly routine functions, such as the scheduling of
depositions, must allow for full client involvement. If a case demands the
collection and dissemination of substantial data, the computer program
containing this information should be in the hands of the group. This
experience-participatory research of issues by people affected-is itself
empowering.
Second, lawyers in these struggles often will be in positions to affect the
processes of decision-making employed by an active group. The opportunities to suggest different models of governance allow the lawyer to draw not
only on restricted notions of procedural forms but also on more participatory
approaches. The politics of consensus building, strategy formulation, and
implementation within the group deserves the sensitive attention of the
lawyer. Time spent on "group processing" often will yield better informed
and better accepted decisions.
Third, lawyers committed to changing power relationships must strive
for creative formulations of issues in concert with organized movements.
Staughton Lynd's concept of communal rights, for example, transcends the
jejune categories of legal understanding that often control the outcomes of
disputes. 34 In the broad form deed campaign, the propagation of more
explicit strategies to counter the impact of absentee corporate control of land
would have focused the movement on a more substantive agenda than the
environmentally oriented one that dominated.
Finally, lawyers must assume a more heuristic role, unencumbered by
the rules, roles, and relationships that more traditional images of law
practice-even prevailing progressive practices-convey. Educating groups
embroiled in resistance requires an approach to professional practice that
seeks out thoughts and feelings, acknowledges uncertainties and contradictions, and links knowledge with ideology. Such a role should plunge
lawyers into continual self-reflection and should ensure that they construct
new visions for embedded problems.
This article has proceeded on the notion that resistance taps into a
community's deepest values and creates alternative agendas often unknown
to the participants themselves. It has assumed that lawyers will continue to
play roles in these disturbances and has outlined an image of practice that
134.

See Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984).
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deserves greater elaboration. Puzzling over issues of power, particularly the
control exercised by power's third dimension, is an endeavor that might help
foster relationships that mirror our aspirations for equality, community, and
justice. Re-examining our role in disputes, such as the broad form deed
campaign, gives more contextualized meaning to our ideas about social,
political, and economic reform.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
This article covers a time span of approximately seventeen years, from
1968 to 1985. The 1984 legislation in Kentucky was invalidated in 1987
in A kers v. Baldwin.13 In A kers,the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
legislature violated the doctrine of separation of powers by enacting a rule
of interpretation governing broad form mineral deeds that honored the
original intent of the parties. 36 The court also intimated that the statute
unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract.' 3 The court thus
rebutted the arguments of the surface owners that the central holding in
Buchanan should be overruled. 3
Nonetheless, the court made a significant concession to the citizens. All
the justices agreed that the parties to the broad form deeds could not have
intended the destruction of the surface. 39 The justices stated, "The
obliteration of the surface would never have been anticipated by the grantor
of the mineral estate."' 4 Consequently, the court in A kers modified
Buchanan to authorize the payment of damages to the surface owner for
surface destruction in the limited situation when the broad form deed
transfer or lease was pre-Buchanan or post-A kers.14 The court noted that

135. 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987). The underlying facts in Akers underscore in
microcosm the continuing nature of the problem that has motivated the struggle to abolish
the broad form deed, In A kers, Elizabeth Wooten, one of the plaintiffs, was the owner of
a small tract of land on Jones Farm of Lot's Creek in Perry County, Eastern Kentucky. Ms.
Wooten was sued by a strip-mine operator after she refused to permit mining on her property.
Id. at 296.
Elizabeth Wooten and her husband Bill bought the property in 1949. The surface had
been severed from the mineral estate under a broad form deed in 1910. Id. Bill Wooten was
buried on the Wooten's hillside property on the contour of the 5-A coal seam. See Brief for
Appellee at app. B
6, 9, Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987) (No. 84-88). This
seam was mined on property adjacent to the Wooten tract. Id. 11. She testified that, while
strip-mining the adjacent land, the coal company degraded her sole source of water. Id.
12.
136. Id. at 308-09.
137. Id. at 310.
138. Id. at 304-05.
139. Id. at 307.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Kentucky stood "naked and alone" among mining states in its decision in
Buchanan.4 2
In 1988, led by the multi-textured organizing efforts of Kentuckians for
the Commonwealth, a citizens social justice group, the people of Kentucky
amended the state constitution as follows:
In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever
the surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a
right to extract minerals, which fails to state or describe in express and
specific terms the method of coal extraction to be employed, or where said
instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral
estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that the
coal be extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected
at the time the instrument was executed, and that the mineral estate be
dominant to the surface estate for the purposes of coal extraction by only
the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to
be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was
executed. "
This approach to the abolition of the broad form deed tracked the early
effort in Tennessee and the approach taken in the 1984 legislation that was
overturned in A kers. The story of this effective grassroots campaign holds
lessons that are beyond the scope of this article but are worthy of intense
critical analysis and understanding.'"
The coal industry did not abandon its legal fight. In 1988, when the
constitutional amendment was enacted, a pivotal case was pending in the
lower courts. Ward v. Harding'4 5 was a quiet title action brought by mineral
holders and a lessee coal company against the surface owners, Eugene and
Garnett Ward, to prevent them from interfering with surface mining on their
property and to quiet the title of the mineral interests. Lawyers from
APPALRED represented the Wards and asked the court to apply the new
constitutional amendment.'4 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court did apply the

142.

Id.at 306.

143. Ky. CONST. § 19(2) (amended 1988).
144. Joe Szakos, the staff coordinator for Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, has
written an insightful account of citizen advocacy and the constitutional campaign to end the
broad form deed. See Joe Szakos, Practical Lessons in Community Organizing in
Appalachia: What We've Learned at Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, in FIGHTING BACK
IN APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 101 (Stephen L. Fisher ed.,
1993).
145. 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
146. Id at 281.
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new constitutional rule and reversed the "broad form deed law" of thirtyseven years that had permitted coal companies to extract coal by surface
mining methods without the landowner's consent. 4 " This decision finally
overruled the holding in Buchanan v. Watson that broad form mineral deeds
authorized strip-mining even though the modem methods of surface mining,
with its consequent destruction, could not have been contemplated by the
parties to the original deed. 4"
The court also upheld the Broad Form Deed Constitutional Amendment
against a federal constitutional challenge under the "impairment of contract"
and "takings" clauses."' The court held that the there was no violation of
the contract clause because the grantor had not conveyed the right to stripmine."5 Further, there was no violation of the takings clause because the
mineral owners had, throughout the years, reaped an unforeseen advantage
that was not protected by the takings clause. 5 ' The United States Supreme
Court denied the industry's petition for a writ of certiorari.' 52
John Rosenberg, the director of APPALRED and the lawyer who
spanned the legal campaign the longest, has argued that our early legal
efforts, though unsuccessful in the courts, paved the way for the growth of
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth and helped crystallize the issue in the
public mind.'53 Under this interpretation, the string of major court defeats
in the late 1960s and 1970s so incensed coalfield citizens-who easily saw
through the courts' opaque rationales-that the conditions were ripe for
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth to organize around the broad form deed
issue and to achieve success. In a perverse way, our clients may have
known better than we that going to court, win or lose, would have beneficial
consequences-although in the long run-for abolishing the deed. In a
sense, the court decisions in Martin and No. 8 Ltd. of Virginia forced the
high court to confront the broad form deed issue in a very public way. As
a result, the groups and individuals represented had their consciousness and

147. Id. at 287.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 288-89.
150. Id. at 288.
151. Id. at 289. For an analysis of Ward, see Leah A. Gatch, Note, Ward v. Harding:
Kentucky Strips Miners of Dominate Rights, Burying a Century of Litigation, 21 N. KY. L.
REV. 649 (1994). See also Owen L. Anderson, Broad-Form Mineral Deeds Upheld by
Kentucky Supreme Coun, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1994, at 33, 34 ("The case
is best explained by recognizing that the Kentucky courts made a mistake when they initially
held that mineral owners had the right to destroy the surface when claiming under a broadform severance instrument executed at a time when the parties could not have contemplated
today's surface mining technology.").
152. See Ward v. Harding, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994).
153. Letter from John Rosenberg to Dean Hill Rivkin (Feb. 18, 1988) (on file with
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resolve affected in ways that would have been impossible without the
litigation (the third face of power rears its head), and mobilization ensued.
The court decisions gave citizens a concrete wrong to overturn, and
through Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, they took it all the way to a
constitutional amendment. In Rosenberg's view, the litigation did not have
a negative effect of suppressing citizen resistance; he believes that the
citizens would have wanted the litigation to proceed as it did."
Rosenberg's deep faith in the wisdom of our clients is one I share. I
have less faith, however, in the law as "a vital and beneficent social institution.""' The danger of using the law to challenge unjust social and
economic arrangements and of ending up legitimating a great injustice is
well illustrated by the pre-constitutional amendment broad form deed
cases.'5 6 Buchanan represented so corrupt an interpretation of the broad
form deed and so naked a grab of power for the coal industry, that it is
difficult to fathom how surface owners turned again to the courts in Martin
to rectify this wrong.
The dance with the legislature was more understandable, although I still
suspect that legislators voted for the 1974 and 1984 legislation because they
were confident that the courts would undo the legislation. In the end, a
constitutional amendment-a groundswell from the citizenry--could not be
ignored by the courts almost forty years after Buchanan. Did our legal
advocacy stifle such a groundswell from erupting much earlier?
Eastern Kentucky still remains hostage to the vicissitudes of the coal
industry.5 7 Local resistance to environmental harms persists.' Except for
cleaning up problems in individual cases, lawyers and clients have looked
beyond the relic of the broad form deed. I will always wonder if the early
broad form deed legal campaign was a diversion from more sustainable
efforts to revitalize grassroots democracy in Appalachia.
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